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T
he topic of the impact of monetary policy on
agriculture is an old one, and one subject to a 
lot of misinformation.1 The misinformation arises
because too few understand that most of what goes
on in agriculture has nothing to do with monetary
policy.  Monetary policy, more or less, involves the
process by which policymakers manage—as best
they can—the amount of money and credit they
create for the economy—otherwise known as
ﬁnancial liquidity.  By contrast, the fundamental
forces that shape the agricultural industry—forces
that determine the behavior of prices and output—
are a consequence of nonmonetary conditions.
Nevertheless, monetary policymakers are called
upon periodically to inﬂuence outcomes in the
farm sector through “easier” monetary conditions.
In fact, messing up monetary policy by diverting 
it from its primary objective of achieving price 
stability will only make agricultural conditions
more difﬁcult.
The chief focus of this article is on the supply
and demand conditions in agriculture.  The ﬁrst 
section contains an analysis of recent trends in 
farm incomes and their inherent volatility.  The 
next two sections cover the particular conditions 
of supply and demand in agricultural markets.
Combining supply and demand conditions leads 
to an analysis of outcomes for price and output.
Following this analysis, we then compare and con-
trast the agricultural sector with computer manu-
facturing, another industry characterized by rapid
productivity growth and falling prices.
With the analysis of the economic fundamen-
tals of agriculture in hand, we then can discuss the
speciﬁcs of monetary policy and what, if anything,
policymakers can do to mitigate periodic adverse
developments down on the farm.  The main mes-
sage is this:  The Federal Reserve needs to con-
centrate on its primary responsibility of keeping
inﬂation low and stable.  Achieving sustained low
inﬂation requires that interest rates sometimes rise
and sometimes fall.  Although interest-rate ﬂuctua-
tions can cause problems in agriculture, there is 
no other known way to keep inﬂation low and 
stable.  Furthermore, compromising monetary 
policy objectives will not help agriculture in the
end, but will actually make things worse by gener-
ating instability in the inﬂation rate, interest rates,
and the level of economic activity.
INCOME VOLATILITY IN AGRICULTURE
As nearly everyone knows—including most 
of those engaged in the business of food and feed
production—the United States is currently in the
midst of a record-breaking business expansion: 
109 months and counting as of April 2000.  Nearly
as remarkable, the current expansion follows on 
the heels of the 92-month-long expansion in 1982-
90, and is more than twice as long as the average 
of all post-World War II business expansions.
Moreover, these two expansions were separated 
by one of the mildest recessions in U.S. history.
Professor John Taylor, a distinguished economist 
at Stanford University, has dubbed the 17-year peri-
od since 1982 “The Long Boom.”2 Since 1982, the
output of U.S. ﬁnal goods and services—or real
GDP—has nearly doubled, growing at an average
annual rate of almost 3.75 percent per year.  By con-
trast, real GDP grew at about 2.25 percent per year
from 1972 to 1982, a period wracked by two severe
economic downturns and high and rising inﬂation.
It thus appears, as Taylor and others have
argued, that a case can be made that improved
monetary policy has played an important role,
though certainly not the only role, in achieving 
this long period of sustained economic growth at 
a healthy pace.  Whatever else might have been
going on, the rate of consumer price index (CPI)
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inﬂation could not have declined from more than
13 percent in 1980 to 2.7 percent over the 12
months ending December 1999 if the Federal
Reserve had not concentrated its efforts on con-
trolling inﬂation.  In fact, inﬂation variability dur-
ing the current business expansion is the lowest of
all previous post-World War II expansions.3 By
sharply reducing the rate of price inﬂation and
establishing ﬁrm expectations in the marketplace
that inﬂation would remain low, monetary policy
has contributed to higher productivity growth and
enhanced the economy’s stability.
In general, the current business expansion has
bestowed numerous beneﬁts for virtually every
demographic group in the United States.4 Still, even
though the U.S. unemployment rate has fallen from
about 11 percent at the end of 1982 to 4 percent in
early 2000, we know that some members of our society
have been left behind.  Many of those in farming and
ranching will respond to these words by thinking,
“Yes, many of us in agriculture have been left
behind.”  Indeed, the last couple of years have 
been rough for U.S. agriculture.
But agriculture always has been a risky and
uncertain business.  In ancient times, farmers suf-
fered from droughts and locusts.  Today, farmers
still suffer from droughts and locusts.  In addition,
ancient farmers suffered not only from natural
hazards but also from market disruptions brought
on by war, the edicts of emperors, and other man-
made problems.  When viewed in this context, it is
not surprising that income volatility is an endemic
characteristic of farming.  
This characteristic is illustrated nicely by
changes in farm incomes during the 1990s.  After
rising to a 21-year high of $54.9 billion in 1996,
real, or inﬂation-adjusted, net farm income subse-
quently fell 13 percent in 1997 and roughly another
3 Inﬂation variability is measured as the standard deviation of the quar-
terly CPI inﬂation rates.  The standard deviation of inﬂation during
the current expansion is about three-quarters of a percentage point,
compared to roughly 2-percentage points during the 1982-90 expan-
sion, about 3.5-percentage points during the 1975-80 expansion and
2.5-percentage points during the 1970-73 expansion.
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10.5-percent in 1998.  Although the latest projections
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
suggest that some improvement occurred in 1999,
this upswing most likely will have stemmed entirely
from a nearly $11 billion jump in government
income transfers to farmers.  For a longer-term per-
spective, as seen in Figure 1, consider that real net
farm income averaged $47.7 billion between 1990
and 1998, roughly 20 percent more than the $39.8
billion annual average seen during the 1980s.
The early 1990s, then, were not so bad, but 
farm income during those years pales next to the
$62.6 billion average real net farm income during
the 1970s.  The tumultuous 1970s, frankly, were an
unusual decade.  Some of agriculture’s good fortune
for that period was purchased at the cost of severe
problems in the 1980s.  Although farm incomes dur-
ing the 1970s rose rather sharply for a few years—
real net farm income jumped from $52 billion in
1971 to $108 billion only two years later—this surge
was the result of several unsustainable factors, such
as the United States allowing the Soviets to enter the
U.S. market to buy every bushel of corn, wheat, and
soybeans they could get their hands on.  But by
1980, against the backdrop of high and rising inﬂa-
tion, high and rising interest rates and a depreci-
ating dollar, real farm income had plummeted to
$29 billion.  Just three years later, it plunged another
27 percent to $21 billion.  By 1983, real net farm
income was more than 80 percent lower than it 
had been just a decade earlier and even lower than
the $25-billion low point reached during the depths
of the Depression in 1932.
Many speciﬁc factors account for sharp swings
in farm income.  Many of these factors, which have
been well chronicled in the literature, will be dis-
cussed below in the context of changes in supply
and demand over time.5 Sufﬁce to say, it seems
clear that the rising farm incomes during the
1970s, which were boosted largely by a sharp rise
in exports, helped to fuel an outbreak of specula-
tive behavior by farmers, ranchers, and investors 
to counter the corrosive effects of high and rising
inﬂation.  As the real price of U.S. farmland soared,
so did farm debt.  The resulting ﬁnancial imbal-
ances that built up during the 1970s, not surpris-
ingly, were unsustainable.
Because farming is an inherently risky busi-
ness, swings in farm incomes over time can be,
have been, and probably will continue to be, quite
dramatic.  Is there something inherently unstable
in agricultural production—that is, beyond normal
variations in weather or, perhaps, macro-policy
mistakes—that contributes to these swings in 
farm incomes over time?  The answer, to be blunt,
is no.  The basic characteristics of agricultural
product markets that contribute to trends in farm
incomes over time, it turns out, are readily explain-
able within the context of an analysis that looks 
at the basics of supply and demand conditions, 
the interaction of which determines prices and
quantities of agricultural products. 
SUPPLY CONDITIONS IN AGRICULTURE
In terms of sheer producing power per unit of
input, American agriculture ranks as an unqualiﬁed
success.  The average U.S. farmer is growing and
harvesting more now than he has at any time in
history—and he’s doing it, in the aggregate, with
fewer inputs.  Indeed, for 100 years or more, U.S.
agriculture has been characterized by fantastic 
productivity advances.  A closer look at this pro-
ductivity explosion reveals some startling statistics.
During the past 75 years, the number of acres har-
vested for corn grain has declined by 16 percent
while production has increased ﬁve-fold.  Similarly,
while cotton production in recent years is little
changed from 1926, when cotton acreage peaked
at just under 45 million acres, yields per acre have
more than tripled while the number of acres har-
vested has fallen by more than two-thirds.  And 
it’s not just crop producers who have become 
more productive.  The number of cattle and calves
peaked at around 132 million in 1975.  Since then,
the cattle inventory has dropped by about a quarter
while meat production has increased 11.5 percent.
Likewise, the number of pounds per broiler pro-
duced has risen from roughly three in 1950 to
nearly ﬁve today. 
In the aggregate, accordingly, the amount of
output produced by each farmer, including farm
employees, has risen from almost $2,300 in 1910
to roughly $35,600 in 1998—or a little more than 
3 percent a year.6 (These ﬁgures, including the real
net farm income measure cited earlier, are in con-
stant dollars, with a base year of 1996.)  Much of this
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increase has occurred since 1973, a period when
productivity in the nonfarm sector began to slow
dramatically.  From 1973 to 1998, the amount of
farm output per worker rose at an average annual
rate of nearly 5 percent per year.  In contrast, the
productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector
during this period measured 1.5 percent a year.
That the industry has been able to increase
production with fewer farmers and ranchers is 
testament to the tremendous beneﬁts gleaned 
from technological innovations.  Doane’s Agricul-
tural Report recently ranked those innovations 
that have contributed to agriculture’s tremendous
productivity advances during the 20th century.7 In
Doane’s view, research and education, mechaniza-
tion, hybrid seed corn, commercial fertilizers and 
chemical pesticides were the top ﬁve improve-
ments.  Most economists probably would con-
cur with these assessments.  But just as the new
technologies associated with the computer, the
Internet, lasers, and telecommunications have 
revolutionized many aspects of the nonagricul-
tural economy, more innovations are on the 
way which, if developed properly, promise even
greater advances in agricultural productivity in 
the future.  
The advent of genetically modiﬁed organ-
isms in many crops, which follows the advances 
in genetic improvements applied to livestock 
production, promises both increased production 
and reduced reliance on pesticides.  Likewise, 
the use of satellite technology to better apportion 
fertilizer and other soil nutrients, combined with
the increased usage of low-till farming, offer the
promise of increased production with reduced
chemical fertilizer applications.  Some of these
technological innovations are controversial.  But
these controversies are a whole other subject.
What needs to be emphasized is that productivity
improvement in agriculture is a great American 
triumph, and understanding it is essential to 
understanding the basics of agricultural markets.
A useful way to summarize this discussion is 
to envision the usual upward-sloping supply curve
with a big arrow on it, pointing to the right, to 
indicate that the entire supply curve is shifting 
out rapidly over time as productivity improve-
ments accumulate.  But since supply bounces
around from year to year depending on growing
conditions—the droughts and the locusts—it 
also is necessary to envision a couple of dashed
supply curves parallel to the solid one.
Demand Conditions in Agriculture
The second half of the Marshallian scissors is
the demand curve.  The demand for agricultural
products, like other “normal” goods, of course,
slopes down.  For our purposes, though, the rele-
vant questions are how steep is it and how does it
move over time?
Let’s start with the movement over time.  The
demand for food rises as the population rises and as
the average income of consumers rises.  The effect
of rising income has been understood for a long
time.  In the mid-19th century, Prussian economist
Ernst Engel put forth the proposition that the more
income you have, the smaller the fraction of your
income spent on food.  This proposition was so well
established that it became known as “Engel’s Law.”
The demand for food products, therefore, increases
proportionately with population, but increases more
slowly than does per-capita income.  For example, 
if per-capita income rises by 3 percent in real terms,
the percentage increase in demand for food products
would be considerably less—perhaps only 1 percent.
In the United States and other high-income coun-
tries, we observe the consistent pattern that expen-
ditures on farm commodities grow more slowly 
than total expenditures.  Thus, expenditures on 
farm commodities decline relative to the economy
as a whole. 
Engel’s law can be seen graphically in Figure 2,
which shows U.S. food expenditures as a share of
total expenditures from 1929 to 1999.8 During the
Depression years, and extending into World War II,
when per-capita real income growth was relatively
weak, consumption of food as a share of total
expenditures rose from about 25 percent to nearly
35 percent.  But as real income growth picked up
after World War II, expenditures on food as a share
of total consumption expenditures fell, reaching
about 14 percent in 1999.
The market for U.S. agricultural production is
not, of course, limited to U.S. consumers.  The
United States, by virtue of its abundant natural
REVIEW
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resources and plentiful supply of capital, enjoys a
distinct comparative advantage in agriculture pro-
duction relative to most other countries.  Given the
limited upside to boosting the domestic demand
for farm products, one way to increase sales of U.S.
farm products is to make them available to con-
sumers in other parts of the world.  And, in fact,
the share of U.S. farm production that is exported
has steadily trended up over time.  From 1935 to
1954, U.S. farm exports averaged 8.5 percent of
total farm output.  This share reached a high of 28
percent in 1980 and has averaged roughly 25 per-
cent since 1988 (see Figure 3).  As important as
exports are to U.S. producers, the reality is that food
demand around the world is subject to Engel’s Law,
which means that world demand for U.S. farm out-
put is unlikely to grow rapidly.  Moreover, as the
recent Asian crisis showed, unexpected demand
disturbances from foreign markets are a fact of life.
It is probably true, then, that export demand—wel-
come though it certainly is—is more volatile than
domestic demand. 
What about the shape of the demand curve for
food?  This analysis can be very brief.  Americans,
or, by extension, consumers in most high-income
countries, don’t consume very much more food
when its price declines—or, equivalently, very
much less when its price increases. We can thus
summarize the demand conditions this way:  The
demand curve for agricultural products is quite
steep, shifts out only gradually over time, and is
somewhat volatile because export demand is
volatile.  The demand curve on our imaginary
chalkboard, in other words, is pretty steep—
inelastic, in economists’ lingo.
Supply and Demand Together—Price and
Output Trends in Agriculture
In any market, price and quantity are deter-
mined by the interaction of supply and demand.
The long-run outcome in agriculture is dominated
by the fact that the supply curve, driven by rapid
productivity improvement, is shifting out more
rapidly than the demand curve.  Thus, agricultural
prices—relative to prices in general—have been
trending down.  Indeed, farm prices have been
falling relative to nonfarm prices for as long as we
Figure 2
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can measure them.  This fact is shown in Figure 4,
which plots the ratio of the implicit price deﬂator
for farm output to the total GDP implicit price
deﬂator (1996=100).  From 1909 to 1941, farm
price increases trailed aggregate price increases by
about three-quarters of a percentage point a year.
That margin doesn’t sound very large, but main-
tained for 30 years, it cuts the relative price of agri-
cultural prices by 21 percent.  There was a brief
interval during World War II and its immediate
aftermath when farm prices shot up dramatically,
largely owing to production constraints during the
War and the subsequent surge in foreign demand
from war-ravaged countries.  From 1941 to 1948,
farm prices advanced at roughly 14.5 percent a
year, while aggregate prices rose a little more than
7.5 percent a year.  
The historical trends reasserted themselves
shortly thereafter, as farm prices subsequently
resumed their downward trend.  The waves of
technological innovations noted earlier ramped 
up production, causing supply growth to outstrip
demand growth.  Even though U.S. living standards
rose in the aftermath of World War II, Engel’s 
Law remained in force and food demand grew rela-
tively slowly.  From 1948 to 1998, relative farm
prices declined by roughly 3 percent a year; by
1998, the relative price of food was 78 percent
below its 1948 level.  Falling relative farm prices, 
in turn, caused farm income to grow more slowly
than nonfarm income. 
Farm output has been growing in absolute
terms, but less rapidly than output of all goods
taken together.  Modest agricultural output growth
is a direct outcome of the fact that the U.S. popula-
tion has been pretty well fed for a long time, and
does not choose to eat that much more even when
the price of food goes lower.  The bottom line, in
terms of long-term trends, is that agricultural
prices have been falling and total output rising 
only modestly.
The inevitable outcome of rapid technological
advance and slow growth of total demand is that
the demand for workers in agriculture declines.  It
seems rather unfair that an especially innovative
and productive sector such as agriculture tends to
Figure 3
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generate low incomes.  In particular, income
prospects are especially bleak for those in agri-
culture who fall behind the cutting edge of techno-
logical improvement.  In the words of the econo-
mist Hendrik Houthakker, “The greater the increase
in farm productivity, the greater the imbalance
between supply and demand of farm products
which has to be corrected by an outﬂow of labor 
or by lower farm prices.”  Moreover, Houthakker
notes that “unless the outﬂow of labor from farm-
ing is fast enough, an increase in farm productivity
leads only to lower farm prices and lower farm
incomes.”9 How low incomes go depends on how
rapidly workers move out of agriculture to indus-
tries with better income prospects.  While the deck
appears stacked against those engaged in farming
and ranching—and this analysis may seem rather
brutal—the fact is that low incomes are driven by
the inexorable economic forces of high productivi-
ty growth, slow demand growth, and insufﬁciently
rapid exit of workers from agriculture.
Consider the following numbers.  From 1910 
to 1932, U.S. farm employment declined modestly,
from 13.6 million to 12.8 million, or about 0.25
percent per year.10 During the 1930s, labor out-
ﬂows accelerated markedly and continued largely
unabated until roughly 1987, when farm employ-
ment totaled just under 3 million, or about a quar-
ter of what it was 50 years earlier.  Persistent labor
outﬂows from the farming sector, naturally, means
that farm employment will steadily decline as a
share of total employment, as is shown in Figure 5.
In 1999, farm employment was about 2 percent 
of total employment, whereas in 1900 about 41
percent of civilian employees were engaged in
farm employment.11
It appears that the major adjustment in the
number of agricultural workers is now over.  Since
1987, farm employment has stabilized, and even
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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risen slightly.  Of course, farm employment contin-
ues to fall as a share of total employment but the
most difﬁcult period in which a large absolute
decline occurred is now past.  
Another way to see the extent to which produc-
tivity gains have ratcheted up farm output over
time is by examining the growth of all inputs, not
just labor input.  Table 1 shows that the index of
total farm output increased by roughly 135 percent
from 1948 to 1996 (the latest observation), or a lit-
tle more than 1.75 percent per year.12 Over this 
period, though, the index of total farm input—a
measure designed to capture the inﬂuence of inter-
mediate inputs like fertilizer, fuel, labor, and capi-
tal—actually declined.  What is interesting is that
nearly all of this decline in input stems from reduc-
tions in labor input.  Whereas inputs of intermedi-
ate products rose 84 percent and capital input rose
33 percent, labor input dropped 70 percent, or
approximately 2.5 percent per year.
Although farm output has increased substan-
tially over time, it has not kept pace with growth 
in the nonfarm sector of the economy.  As seen in
Figure 5, from 1889 to 1966, real farm output as 
a percent of total GDP declined from nearly 8.5 
percent to about 1.25 percent.  Since then, it has
remained fairly constant, implying that the rate of
return to agriculture has more or less stabilized at
its long-run rate.  The continued existence of inefﬁ-
cient farms, though, suggests that other factors are
keeping some resources in the industry that might
well earn a higher return elsewhere.
Now is the time to put our chalkboard to work.
This Marshallian dance is depicted in Figure 6.  As
noted earlier, both the supply (S) and demand (D)
curves for agriculture are fairly inelastic, some-
thing that has been known to agricultural econ-
omists for quite some time.13 The supply and
demand curves are dancing around, sometimes
creating large and painful declines in prices, and
sometimes delightful increases in prices—delight-
12 The index values in this paragraph are found in the Economic 
Report of the President (2000), Tables B-97 and B-98, pp. 418-19.
13 See Gardner (1992).
Figure 5
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ful for producers, anyway.  The dance sometimes
yields painful declines in output—the years of
droughts and locusts—and sometimes enormous
bumper crops.  And these ﬂuctuations occur on top
of long-run trends characterized by declining prices
and modestly rising output.  The long-run trend is
illustrated in Figure 6 by the fact that the supply
curves, S1 to S4, increase proportionately more than
the demand curves, D1 to D4, across time.
AGRICULTURE AND COMPUTER
INDUSTRIES COMPARED
It is interesting to compare agriculture with the
computer industry—another industry character-
ized by high productivity growth.  Though the two
industries are vastly different in terms of their out-
put, the qualitative nature of their labor input, and
the production processes they employ, the comput-
er and agriculture industries do share a couple of
key characteristics.  First, the two are both capital
intensive.  Second, the prices of their outputs con-
tinue to fall relative to the prices of all other goods
and services.  In fact, unlike farm prices, personal
computer prices have actually fallen in absolute
terms since they entered the marketplace.  Since
1978, computer prices have fallen by an average of
17 percent per year, while prices for all output, as
measured by the GDP chain price deﬂator have risen
by about 3.75 percent per year.  Thus, the relative
price of computers has declined by more than 20
percent per year—much more, recall, than the 3-per-
cent per-year drop in relative agricultural commodity
prices.  Why are computer ﬁrms getting rich while
farmers face the threat of bankruptcy?
In both agriculture and computer manufactur-
ing, supply conditions are dominated by rapid pro-
ductivity improvement.  But demand conditions in
the two industries are very different.  In fact, com-
puter output has risen much faster than aggregate
output.  While the demand for farm commodities 
is relatively insensitive to price and income changes,
the demand for personal computers is not.  In
terms of basic supply and demand analysis, the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Growth of Farm Productivity, Inputs, and Output
Compound Annual Rates of Change 1948-73 1973-96 1948-96
Total Farm Output 1.85 1.78 1.81
Total Livestock Output 1.99 1.33 1.67
Total Crop Output 1.72 2.00 1.86
Total Farm Inputs 0.20 -0.41 -0.09
Farm Labor -3.01 -1.91 -2.48
Farm Real Estate 0.30 -0.41 -0.04
Durable Equipment 3.03 -1.67 0.75
Energy 1.35 0.25 0.82
Fertilizer 3.09 -0.73 1.24
Pesticides 10.37 2.70 6.63
Farm Labor Productivity 5.09 3.80 4.47
Farm Multifactor Productivity 1.64 2.19 1.90
Addenda:
Nonfarm Business Sector Productivity1 1.67 1.47 2.00
Nonfarm Business Sector Multifactor Productivity 1.89 0.21 1.08
1 Nonfarm business sector productivity measures extend back only to 1959 at the present time.
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computer demand curve is shifting rapidly to the
right, as income rises.  Unlike the demand for agri-
cultural products, the computer demand curve 
has a relatively ﬂat slope (see Figure 7).  Business
demand for computers is rising rapidly, of course,
because computers so enhance the productivity of
production processes of all sorts of goods, includ-
ing agricultural goods, and because of falling prices
of computer goods.  In fact, it seems likely that the
vast increase in the use of computers has con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to the acceleration in non-
farm labor productivity growth.
Thus, rising real personal incomes and increas-
ing business use of computers propel the computer
demand curve outward, and declining computer prices
driven by the outward shift in supply stimulates higher
purchases as we slide down the relatively ﬂat demand
curve.  The outcome, as seen in Figure 7, is that com-
puter production is exploding.  Since 1959, output of
computer and ofﬁce equipment has increased at an
average annual rate of 21 percent per year, whereas
total factory output and real GDP both rose only about
3.5 percent per year.  Now, if only farmers could ﬁnd
a way to stimulate demand for a bushel of corn on
every desktop!
MONETARY POLICY AND AGRICULTURE
From time to time, every central bank ﬁnds
that it must change interest rates to maintain low
and steady inﬂation.  Let’s take a moment to under-
stand why.
Suppose there were some way for the central
bank to achieve low inﬂation without acting directly
on interest rates.  For example, suppose the central
bank controlled money growth directly—indeed, there
is an extensive literature arguing that this policy is 
the one central banks should pursue.14 The Federal
Reserve might raise and lower money growth as
needed to achieve its objective of low and steady
inﬂation.  Interest rates would ﬂuctuate freely in the
marketplace.  Even when the Fed maintained rock
steady money growth, interest rates might rise or 
fall.  In particular, when the economy boomed, rates
would tend to rise as households and ﬁrms bid for
funds to ﬁnance spending on new investment, houses,
cars, and all the other things people commonly ﬁnance
by borrowing.  Similarly, when the economy slowed,
interest rates would tend to fall, even if the Fed did
nothing but maintain steady money growth.
A strong economy tends to push interest rates up
and a weak economy tends to push interest rates
down, this is illustrated nicely by the recent Japanese
experience.  Most are aware that Japanese growth
has been somewhere between anemic and nonex-
istent for a good number of years.  In fact, since the
fourth quarter of 1991, Japanese real GDP has grown
at an average rate of only 0.7 percent per year.  Since
the fourth quarter of 1996,  Japanese output has actu-
ally declined at about a 1.25 percent annual rate.
Meanwhile, interest rates on short-term Japanese
Figure 6
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government securities have been at or near zero
percent for the last year, and still the economy con-
tinues to stumble along. 
The Federal Reserve, along with almost all
other central banks, conducts monetary policy by
adjusting its target for the interest rate on short-
term interbank borrowing, known in the United
States as the federal funds rate.  The Fed calls this
target the intended federal funds rate.  What the
Fed tries to do is to mimic, in broad outline, how
the federal funds rate would ﬂuctuate if the Fed
could set the rate of inﬂation directly, or through
some other policy tool such as money growth.  If
the Fed fails to adjust the intended federal funds
rate appropriately, it will fail in its mission to
achieve low and steady inﬂation.
When the Fed raises the intended federal funds
rate, other interest rates typically follow.  In fact,
other rates not infrequently lead the intended rate, 
as the market anticipates what the Fed is going to 
do.  Almost everyone who has borrowed funds 
using short-maturity loans—and, therefore, expects
to pay higher rates on those borrowings in the
future—everyone in the process of borrowing funds,
and everyone thinking about borrowing in the future
feels hurt by the increase in interest rates.  And since
almost everyone in the country either has borrowed,
is in the process of borrowing, or expects to borrow
in the future, this means that there is almost univer-
sal pain whenever interest rates rise.
But what is the choice?  If interest rates don’t rise
in a timely fashion, then sooner or later inﬂation will
begin to rise.  When that happens, investors will put
additional upward pressure on interest rates, to pro-
tect their capital from being eroded by inﬂation.  So,
a central bank that delays raising rates does not, in
the end, avoid rate increases, but, instead, imposes
both higher inﬂation and, eventually, even higher
interest rates on society.
Because the lessons that ﬂow from procrastina-
tion in monetary policy were learned so painfully
during the 1970s, and because Fed policy has been
so successful since 1982, when the inﬂation of the
1970s was ﬁnally conquered, complaints about
periods during which interest rates rise have been
relatively muted.  Still, when interest rates rise,
farmers, agricultural implement manufacturers and
dealers, and other related businesses often com-
plain.  So also do home builders, whose industry is
especially interest-sensitive, car manufacturers and
dealers, and many others.  And while the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) takes these con-
siderations into account during its deliberations, at
the end of the day policy must be made on what is
best for the country as a whole.
Sometimes, to push this reasoning further, the
argument is a bit different.  When agriculture, or
any other industry, is going through a difﬁcult peri-
od, pleas for assistance are understandable.  Why
can’t the Fed lower interest rates to help in such
situations?  For example, when the Asian economic
crisis hit in mid-1997, U.S. agricultural exports
were especially hard hit.  The crisis deepened in
mid-1998 with the Russian default.  The Fed did
lower interest rates in the fall of 1998, to prevent
the ﬁnancial disruption from spilling over to affect
the stability of the U.S. economy.  As ﬁnancial con-
ditions returned to normal last year, the Fed raised
the intended fed funds rate, and market rates rose
as well.  But the effects of the Asian problems on
the farm economy lingered, and continue to linger
to this day.  In 1999, exports of agricultural com-
modities in nominal terms declined for the third
year in a row, and were down 20 percent from their
1996 peak of $60.4 billion. 
Now, we’re not suggesting that Fed policy should
be unaccountable.  Indeed, Fed policy should be
examined and reexamined continuously in vigorous
public debate, and it is.  The Fed needs to defend
and explain its policy decisions, and all senior
Federal Reserve ofﬁcials contribute to that process
in innumerable ways.
Many people do not understand, however,  that
as powerful as monetary policy is, a central bank
has essentially only one policy instrument.  I like
to think of that instrument as the rate of money
growth—or, more generally, the provision of liquid-
ity to the economy—over the long run.  In the
short run, the Fed implements its control over the
growth of liquidity by setting the intended federal
funds rate.  With only one policy instrument, the
central bank can at best achieve only one policy
objective.15 That objective is a low and stable rate
of inﬂation.  If the Fed tries to pursue other objec-
tives, it may lose control over the rate of inﬂation.
Our experience during the 1970s drove home
with stark clarity the consequences of losing control
over the rate of inﬂation.  The economy suffered
from high and unstable interest rates, rapid swings 
in the international value of the dollar and increased
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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instability of employment and output.  The reces-
sions of 1973-75 and 1981-82 were among the most
severe downturns in U.S. history.  The instabilities of
this period added to the burdens suffered by agricul-
ture, homebuilders, and other industries.
The U.S. economy is dynamic and rapidly
changing.  At any given time, certain industrial 
and geographic sectors are bound to lag the overall
economy, while others do better than the overall
economy.  Monetary policy can do little to help the
lagging sectors—there are no policy instruments at
the Fed’s disposal that have sector-speciﬁc effects.
With respect to agriculture, in particular, economic
research generally shows that monetary policy actions
have no signiﬁcant effects on relative agricultural
prices.16 The Fed’s responsibility is to maintain low
and stable inﬂation and—to the extent possible within
this basic objective—to smooth temporary distur-
bances.
A FINAL WORD
The main message of this article is simple:  U.S.
agriculture is a spectacular success story of high pro-
ductivity growth maintained over an amazingly long
period of time.  Most U.S. success stories can be char-
acterized as enjoying a period of rapid growth and
innovation followed in a relatively few years by a
mature stage of slow growth.  Think of railroads, 
automobiles, and steel.  U.S. agriculture, on the other
hand, is characterized even today by exciting gains 
in productivity; yet, it is not a mature industry.  Never-
theless, the industry today suffers from the same prob-
lems it has always suffered from: droughts, locusts,
and market disruptions.  It is a risky enterprise, and
anyone who really understands the economies of
agriculture can only have great respect for those who
cope and prosper in this business.
The contribution monetary policy can make 
to agriculture is quite simple:  to maintain low and
steady inﬂation.  Farmers, ranchers, and policymak-
ers of all stripes should not underestimate the impor-
tance of agriculture to a stable overall U.S. economy.
Low inﬂation, stable inﬂation expectations, relatively
low interest rates on the average, high, and stable
employment, all contribute to stability of the agricul-
tural economy.  The reality is that the fundamental
economic forces controlling the destiny of agricul-
ture—high productivity growth, the hazards of nature,
the low price and income elasticities of demand, and
the instability of conditions in important export mar-
kets—are things that the Fed can do nothing about.
But the Fed can help to maintain a stable domestic
economy.  If the Fed can continue to be successful in
tempering that important historical source of insta-
bility to U.S. agriculture, it will have done its job well.
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